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STATE OF UTAH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR. 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG-
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREIN-
HOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
A R G U M E N T 
Appellants deem it necessary to reply to a number 
of matters improperly raised by Respondents1 briefs. 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT I THAT THIS APPEAL 
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
ADJUDICATED BY THIS COURT AND IS RES JUDICATA. 
Point I in Respondents* briefs attempts to raise 
a matter already heard and decided by this Court. Respondents 
made a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it 
was not timely filed. This Court denied said motion. Rule 
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
Case No. 14006 
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either party may petition this Court for rehearing within 
twenty days after the decision is filed. Respondents did 
not petition for rehearing as provided, and therefore the 
decision is res judicata. 
In any case, because the appeal was not solely 
in unlawful detainer, the longer period in which an appeal 
may be taken is applicable. See Weyer v. Peterson, 16 Utah 
2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED ON APPEAL 
TO RAISE ISSUES WHICH ARE NOT DEFENSIVE UN-
LESS THEY HAVE CROSS-APPEALED OR FILED THE 
ALTERNATIVE STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
Respondents' Points II, III and IV (b) are not 
properly raised and should not be considered by this Court, 
as Respondents failed to raise those points as required. 
Rule 74(b) provides that: 
. . . where any one or more parties have 
filed a Notice of Appeal as required by Rule 
73, other parties may separately or together 
cross appeal from the order or judgment of the 
lower court without filing a Notice of Appeal; 
provided, however, such party or parties shall 
file a statement of the points on which he 
intends to rely on such cross appeal within the 
time and as required by subdivision (d) of 
Rule 75. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents did not cross appeal or file any state 
ment of points. They cannot now properly allege that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lower court erred in regard to any matter not relied on by 
Appellants* Respondents are not entitled to ask this Court 
to reverse the lower court on any of the items contained in 
their Points II, III and IV (b) because those points are 
taking issue with the lower court's decision and are not 
defensive. 
POINT III. 
UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT AN 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER OCCURS IF A DEFAULT IS NOT 
CURED AFTER NOTICE. 
Section 78-36-3(5) Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
provides: 
§ 78-36-3. A tenant of real property, for a 
term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(5) When he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure 
to perform any condition or covenant of the 
lease or agreement under which the property 
is held, . . . and after notice in writing 
requiring in the alternative the performance 
of such conditions or covenants or the 
surrender of the property, served upon him, 
and, if there is a subtenant in actual oc-
cupation of the premises, also upon such sub-
tenant, shall remain uncomplied with . . . 
after service thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents failed to comply with the terms of the 
lease and refused to cure those defaults after notice. Under 
the above statute, plaintiffs are clearly entitled to posses-
sion. Respondents' citations of authority in Point VI of 
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their briefs are not applicable in light of the above 
statute. 
>is /2V DATED this /5TT day October, 197 5. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES A. ARROWSMITH 
Watkins & Faber 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Reply Brief to Hardin A. Whitney and 
Wayne G. Petty, of Moyle & Draper, 600 Deseret Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Nikols, and two copies to F. Alan Fletcher, of Par-
sons, Behle & Latimer, 79 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, attorneys for Defendant-Respondent DAB Associates, 
postage prepaid, this /sc day of October, 1975. 
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I N THE 
flllPKUMi: COURT 
OF THE 
cTAVK OF IJ'L'AH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, jd. 
and BARBARA A,\M -TBVENSEN, 
1 i ';-,.; 
Case No. 14 0 06 
) 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG- ) 
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREIN-
HOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES, ) 
Del* "fidcJttl S" Respondents. ) 
BRIEl ] i
 Ml • ' , : < ' ^ L j , > , 1"'S 
STATEMENT .""' THh K v ) Ji- * ASE 
A p p e l l a n t s l e a ^ ^i + >>. -* - - >•.- i 
fac i . 1 il, i i,.!!.) ol[ I ll'ic" Sd.lt: L i . • , . . , ., u .S .^i ^formerly 
the Towne House) to Respondeni N.. - Nikols ;korei i i u r 
Mikols) ,. i i/ho subleased t ' * * ! - ' . *B 
Associa tes , Anagnostakis
 vaH^irj * hi (n:.< -t and Dames 
(hereinaf ter DAB or Agg i , Because ) .ir *i»* -J^t,. , ^ s 
under the lease*, Af-pH Lan! ", broiKjhl: an unlawlul de ta i ner 
ac t ion . Respondents counter claimed tot broach of the 
covenant of qu ie t possession, DAB a 1 r.o lunqht re LTTIJUII ^emen t 
r i > if c \ I a i; <j L > s 1: J y n 11 < ,|> n i b t •> i •' *;: i » i A p p e 1 1 a 111 s ' c I u t > . 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The district court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary 
presiding, dismissed Appellant's Complaint and Respondents' 
Counterclaims/ but awarded attorneys' fees to Respondents. 
The court also awarded DAB $613.01 for charges by Appel-
lants' members. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
- : — , . | 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
decision as to dismissal of their complaint/ award of I 
attorneys' fees to Respondents and award of $613.01 to DAB. _ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts has been divided into 
numbered paragraphs for more convenient reference. ] 
1. Appellants own and operate the Salt Lake 
Athletic Club. (R. 83). I 
2. The Athletic Club had approximately 1500 I 
members, with approximately 250 family memberships and 
approximately 100 memberships issued to minors (R. 84) , and . i 
the dining room facilities were available to them. (Para-
graph 8 of House Rules, Exhibit 19-P). 
3. During the ten years when Appellants oper-
ated the dining room/ they had a complete salad bar with 
twenty or more different items, and four to eight entrees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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every day for lunch and at least six to eight entrees and 
the sa lad bar in !;he evening. (R, *•}<>). : -
4. Appellants leased the Towne House Restaurant 
facilities to Nikols on or about Decembei 
for preparing and serving such food and beverage* i ia 
members as Appellants had previously suppl eci l 
The 1 ease provided that i hi I: he* event thor •' • t 
food and beverage bu.si.ne:-^ from Club members, Nikols was 
permitted to -v - thp premises to the put hi.;, \%^. i*; 4ii). 
5 u **;: j r -' tlie Sul b a s e between Appellants 
and Respondent Nikols provided that Nikols woal.d na;/e 
available and prepare .INH s^rv^ in i [ni men] i 
beverages in the types and qualities being served l 
Appellants and at the following t- miosi 
Monday through Friday 
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 a.m. 
DInner Saturday 
7:30 p.me ? 
-. : ''quired to have sandwiches and ,a L.»N:-. available1 
Monday through Saturday from 6:00 _ __._
 Ar_...J 
(R. 246). 
6 Nikols admitted that Appellants sought him 
because he was a master chef and because of his reputati on 
as a good restauranteu. r (R ] 80) , ai id t: .1 iat 1 le went nil, > the 
Towne House to provide great and excellent quality of food 
and variety. (R. 181). •-:. =• t 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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7. Nikols did not change the format when he took 
over (R. 92) . He testified he had six or eight or more 
different entrees (R. 173, 174), and that he maintained the 
revolving salad bar, which had a great variety of salads, 
all during the period he ran the restaurant. (R. 180). 
8. Nikols opened the premises to the public in 
the spring of 1973 (R. 164), but tried to give the best 
menu items possible to bring in the customers. (R. 174). 
When Nikols opened to the public, he advertised the ex-
cellent cuisine. (R. 172). 
9. There was no cover charge while the rest-
aurant was private. (R. 167). After the restaurant was 
opened to the public, on most Fridays and Saturdays when 
Nikols had a local band, he did not charge a cover charge. 
(R. 178). Most of the time there was no cover charge on 
weeknights. (R. 175). 
10. On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols sub-
leased the restaurant to DAB (R. 254), who operate Aggie's 
Club and Restaurant on the premises. (R. 9). 
11. Nikols testified that Aggie was required to 
maintain excellent food and service. (R. 184). 
12. Nikols testified that Aggie worked as a 
manager, but did not have any knowledge as a restauranteur. 
(R. 183). 
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i 
door charge or "package" - (P. 17) ,» The package inel udes 
the patrons* cover charge, floor show, dancing, all the 
patrons1 beer, and aLJ their drink mix. (R. ?0, 220), 
14. Under Agqir'n ojicfni ion, on Wednesday 
evenings, the only tood available w «*^st in of dinner 
for $1 ()(i jn addition to f he $5.00 UUUJ r .; IMI.I 
evening1 , "lily n payhctti dinner w-ac a^.H ible for. . I3t" 
i n add I I L on to the $5.00 door charge-. \K* ir-m, '?/./ 
1'". Aggie distotrl i rtm d '"n1 salad L.'i on July 
.1 ':>, ( H > I , (R //In 
Id. Aggie operates under a rinsn "'"' Boer 
* - - - . - • , +-he 
premises « ,-«,.•. h ^ >< cabaret licen^^. 
,~- ~ , (Exhib:i 
17. For , period AUTJF" "  ""^* *hroLU." 
Novembe , i •* Aggie1F package sales exceeded total 
food sale^ , • i * • ; c L^S exceeded 
dinner <z*~ _•.- . . d • i >-r. . • * ';mber ,*f Tuesday 
evening- ^n^r Aggie1 • -y , v, ^ /( * , r 
ad * - ., . . J i; p u:kage 
1
 "v figures showr ft . •; J 
i > .*;, * >:c * • ; Wednesday and 
Thursday nights, when for in additic* ) . i r .* jjeef 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Aggie testified that on Wednesdays and Thursdays, a lot 
of his customers don't eat. (R. 17). 
19v Mr. Rinehart Peshell testified that on 
October 29, 1974 (a Tuesday evening) he arrived at Aggie's 
Club at approximately 10:30 p.m. (R. Ill), that he observed 
no one eating (R. 112), and that he only observed mixers 
being brought by girls and drinks brought in by patrons. 
(R. 112). Aggie's records show no dinner sales that 
evening. (Exhibit 7-P). 
20. Lorraine Heugly testified she visited 
Aggie's Club with her husband on October 29, 1974 (R. 138). 
They arrived at approximately a quarter to nine. There 
was no linen or silverware on the table. No one offered 
them a menu, and she did not observe anyone eating that 
evening. (R. 139). Neither Mrs. Heugly nor her husband 
asked for a menu (R. 141-142). She didn't intend to eat 
when she went there. She didn't know it was a place to 
eat. She thought it was a club. (R. 142). 
21. Mrs. Heugly also attended Aggie's Club on 
October 31, 1974. She was not given a menu, she observed 
no one eating, and to her knowledge none of the tables were 
set up with silverware or napkins. She didn't expect there 
would be anything to eat. (R. 142). 
22. Aggie testified he employed an entertainment 
group called "Promises"(R. 25, 37) who put on a floor show 
called "Rip Rock and the Stick Shifts", in which they used 
the words "ass", "shit", (R. 44, 45) and "horny" (R. 48) in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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their act since August lr 1974, ' . >• ' 
23. Appellant testified thai hfj li.nl witnessed 
Agg;iep,i I luor show in August and that lit? bad heard one of 
Aggie's entertainers state, "If I have offended anybody, 
fuck you. \i\. 
2* K" shell testified that T^ w;tnessed 
the floor show of P ] ^v-r
 :,:.- * *.> *->7.4: Shiftb un -
night uf i l > i.i.tertainers ::«iiied 
on a conversal - concerning tbi-i» sexual prowess, a^ing 
some female patrons a^ an « \ imr 
ei iter tainc ? organs w^re small a^; 'I..*: fi ^!n w !•, 1a- 3 
vagina was laron because lie had engaged ri -f-y wit!: 
There was a r. J 1 r 11 >.hnw in vlueh line s I. eje showed a lady 
with bared breasts. The group presented a further routine 
two young men riding in a car, discus si nq tlieir desire 
1 1 tit 1' room se, er.ibn, itching and their sexual organs. 
After drinking beerr one indicated he needed to relieve 
himself, and proceeded to art out. 11 r 1. na t: incj. (R I J J-lib) . 
:!!") • On November 13, 1974, Mr. Peshell again 
visited Aggie's Club (R. 115). One of the entertainers 
acted as if he opened a can of 1.x "re using His sexual organ. 
The entertainers also acted out: urinating on some of the 
patrons (R, 118). Aggie was there on both occasions. 
26, Ken Rasmusser. a membei . 1 -'•,•• Town- House 
Athletic Club, testified 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the restaurant first when Appellant and then when Nikols 
ran the restaurant, but they ceased when Aggie took over. 
(R. 106-107)• He would no longer let them go because of 
the type of operation. (R. 107). 
27. David R. Davidson, Jr., a member of the 
Towne House, testified he had two minor daughters who 
patronized the restaurant prior to the time it became 
Aggie's when Appellants and Nikols operated it, and that 
they have not gone to it since it became Aggie1s Club and 
Restaurant because a sign says "No Minors Allowed". (R. 108-
109). 
28. Aggie had charges of approximately $613.01 
from Towne House members. (R. 198-199). 
20. Aggie testified that Appellant never asked 
him to carry any charges for him (R. 198, 201) and that 
Appellants refused to back up charges by members so that 
Aggie's would extend them credit. (R. 211). 
30. Appellant's bookkeeper received Aggie's 
bill for charges and went over it with him. (R. 201). 
There was no evidence she agreed the bill was owed or 
had authority to so agree. 
31. Aggie testified he assumed Appellant would 
pay the charges when he sent him the statement. (R. 200). 
32. Paragraph 16 of the Sublease dated December 
1, 1971 between Appellants and Respondent Nikols, provides 
in part: •--••••-.™-.-.: -,..,..._:.„ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if 
either defaults in any of the conditions 
and terms of this lease, the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including attorney fees, which may 
arise or accrue from enforcing this 
lease or in obtaining possession of the 
premises or in pursuing any remedy pro-
vided by the laws of the State of Utah 




WHEN THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALi^i r-^  -
THAT APPELLANTS HAD NOT BREACHED THE 
NIKOLS SUBLEASE, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE 
COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS1 FEES TO 
RESPONDENTS. 
Nikols counterclaimed against Appellants for 
breach of the covenant of quiet possessij m i.u Paragraph 11 
of the Sublease between Appellants and Nikols, arid claimed 
attorneys" fees. The court's award of attorneys1 fees 
was clear I y improper Tho Sublease? between Nikols and the 
Appellants provides that in the event of default; the 
defaulting party won .Id pay attorneys1 fees, Thorp is 
other prov.Lc5iou o>r alt omt'ys1' tees. The court specifically 
determined that Nikols had no cause of action against 
Appellants, In spite of I ho faol that i ho rour t da smissed 
a I. ,1 oonnLs of Nikuls' clai ms as to alleged breach of the 
Sublease by Appellants (R. 348), the court awarded N. i ko] , ; • 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fees should have been awarded. Such award would be 
improper under both the Stevensen-Nikols Sublease and 
the Nikols-DAB Sublease Agreement. • ... 
In addition, the award of attorneys1 fees to 
DAB was improper for another reason. Paragraph 16 of the 
Sublease Agreement between Nikols and DAB, under which 
the court awarded attorneys' fees to DAB, is binding only 
upon Nikols and DAB. Appellants were not ever parties 
to that agreement. Respondent Nikols could not bind ^ 
Appellants to an agreement to pay attorneys' fees to his 
sublessees. 
This court has frequently stated that attorneys' 
feesjre not recoverable unless provided for by the contract 
or authorized by statute. See Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
i 
i 
attorneys' fees in the amount of $3,665.63. Because the I 
court dismissed Nikols' claims, there was no basis on 
which to award attorneys' fees. 
The court again erred in awarding attorneys' 
fees to DAB, who had counterclaimed against Appellants 
for breach of the covenant of quiet possession contained I 
in the Sublease Agreement between DAB and Nikols, and 
sought general damages in the amount of $4,500. The 
court dismissed DAB's claim, no cause of action, (R. 348), 
but awarded DAB attorneys' fees in the amount of $3,175.00. 
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Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Ut. 2d 377, 
32 5 P . ?d "•'•"''• ' 19 j8} • in the :i.ns 1:a nt" case, w e 1 lave i Iei the :i : 
Jiocdiiiu' M . •. - was not entitled to be awarded attorneys1 
fees under his Agreement wi th Appellants, and. because DAB 
had i -.:.•• '»*:• n t: w i tl I Appe] 1 ant .s, t .1 le t J : 
soluteLV wrong in awarding attorneys 1 fees to Respondents.. 
POINT II 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE THAT 
RESPONDENTS DAB HAD CHANGED THE OPER-
ATION OF THE RESTAURANT, THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE FOUND AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT RESPONDENTS HAD BREACHED THE LEASE. 
'• • • ••-£•'.'• Under paragraph 1 of {-Tv Sublease with Appellants, 
Nikols assumed the operation ?>f T>rervir]e^ eet serving such 
f • - h., -,J • -, ,./i ;]i.j::Iy s u p p l i e d 
t ;u-»mb«-rs if i > i l'i\ ;i :.h* I P - - :>ne,e room and kitchen 
area, Nikols w,u *** :TM?/od to nav^. . •
 s 
to Club member i: . .» . . i bevoraqn = * »»* i vpcs ana 
qualities then S O J v c u t/ ^MMOJlarua m o f ser^r le- i 
Monday through > * • 
Saturday from ?: i . '. . : j ^ sand-
wiches and c, * -K-> *iv . l i M ^ Monday " T O J . * ^ ituri.v* - • m 
6 : 0 0 p mi • • : * • r : . , i . •. . 
service if he-! so determined, In the evmit there was not 
sufficient business from club meiribei " I11 nuke l:h° bu,1; ln.es s 
pi ofitdbli, then under paragraph 9 ut tht :^ioiease, Nikols 
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was permitted to open the premises to the public and make 
it a public restaurant. (See Statement of Facts 4 and 
5). •'.' :\.r::^m^ vMt:ooen:tc : ^ > , - - ^ / ". 
The evidence was clear and uncontradicted that 
during the ten years Appellants operated the dining room 
facilities at The Towne House Athletic Club, they had 
maintained a revolving salad bar with twenty entrees, 
plus a menu with four to eight entrees at lunch and six 
to eight entrees for dinner* Appellants sought out Nikols 
because of his reputation as a master chef and fine 
reStauranteur. When Nikols subleased the restaurant from 
Appellants, he maintained the salad bar and offered six 
to eight or more entrees off the menu. Members took 
their minor children to the restaurant. A cover charge 
was imposed only on a few occasions while the restaurant 
was private. When Nikols opened the restaurant to the 
public, he advertised the excellent cuisine. He only 
charged a cover charge when there was expensive entertain-
ment. On weeknights he tried not to charge a cover charge, 
and on most weekends he did not. (See Statement of Facts 
3, 6 through 9, 26 and 27). 
Aggie drastically changed the operation of the 
restaurant. He discontinued the salad bar. He obtained 
a Class "C" Beer License and thereafter prohibited minors 
from using the restaurant facilities. He instituted a 
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p
 h ,^  _ . , "ovprpc, entrance -
entertainment a ; i t - s^h patron's ! i . 1 iri * rr 
His business recuias t>now ^ 
income came fro^ his package u*< *> « *« • . o,» !• • . 
For the period of August ] , 1974 through November j - . 1974, 
packag> s sales exceeded tot .a] food sa 1 es by over : 
times. For that period, package sales exceeded the evei ii ng 
dinner sales by eight times • In f act,- Agg:i e' s fansi i Iess 
record Liow that on a number of evenings, there were no 
food sales at all. Witnesses testified that on the night: 
of Tuesday, Oc tobe i ?0 , I lfi 7 4 - t;In*y \>bser^ n - .• » oi le 2ati i lg# 
no tables were set up # and they wen.* i lot c tfered menus. 
One witness testified she did not know she could get food 
ther>? I;K "oausif! sh<» though I i I was <\ c I ml:1 Kirrthor, Aggie 
brought in ci group of entertainers whose show Included 
reference to sexual intercourse, sex orpins,. ur Inat i< >n 
iiiul ,s Liiiil.it material. (See Statement of Facts 1 3 through 2 5 ) . 
These facts clearly establish that Aggie 1s 
operate oi i d:i ffered substai itJ a ] ] } fi c n i t .1 I = ; ; a} i i i w 1 :i i : II i 
Appellants and Respondent Nikols operated the restaurant., 
Aggie's operation resembles a bar rather than a restau-
rant .  •. ; ' •, '.' ; '•- • 
Appellants could find no TJi «ih e.jses where a court 
has construed the meaninq of "public restamrai i t *" M Il 
liases 11 i MII other jurisdictions involving a judicial inter-
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pretation of this term have concerned liquor control, 
zoning or civil rights statutes. 
Aggie's operation was not open to the public. 
Aggie's obtained a Class "C" Beer License. Section 
19-3-9 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances provides: 
Unlawful to Permit Minors in Certain 
Establishments. It shall be unlawful 
r for any licensee of a Class "c", or 
Class "D", license for the sale of beer, 
, o^ any operator, agent or employee of ,f 
such licensee to permit any person 
>, under the age of twenty-one years to 
remain in or about such licensed premises. 
It is significant that Aggie's chose to obtain and operate 
under a Class "C" permit. The traditional restaurant 
beer license, a Class "B" permit, requires that sixty 
percent (60%) of the restaurant's revenue be derived from 
the sale of food. (Section 19-1-11, Salt Lake City 
Ordinances). As can be seen from Exhibit 7-P, Aggie's > 
Club could not meet this requirement. By obtaining the 
Class "C" permit, Aggie excluded all minors as well as all 
minor members of The Towne House Club who formerly had 
full rights to use the facilities. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "public" as being 
"open to all". Where Aggie's operation denied admission 
to a significant portion of the public, all minor members 
of the Athletic Club, and all minor children of members, 
the Court should have found as a matter of law that Aggie 
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v • , - in restaurant within the terms of 
the Sublease. 
M o i f M >vr1x r f A i fii i»•' i - i" 1 1 1 1 » (I«'i" .i.i i in 11 111 c < 1 1 : (i f iy * 5 e t -
iiiition of restaurant used by Salt Lake City. Section 
51-2-42A (1972) of the Salt Lake City Zoning Ordinance 
provides: ' ' ••;:"' • :; s 
RESTAURANT, "Restaurant" shall mean 
a building within which there is served 
a variety of hot food for consumption 
on the premises and where more than 
sixty (60%) percent of the gross volume 
is derived from the sale of foods 
served for consumption on the premises. 
For purposes of" nbhuninq <\ i ji.ee "n" n<ri License, beef 11 m 




 >V . . . shall mean premises where a 
variety of hot food is served for con-
sumption on the premises and where 
more than sixty percent of the gross 
volume of business is derived from the 
sale of food served for consumption 
•^v-.-\'' ',:^ 8;.r; on the premises. • •• •• ••••. - •• 
• A very high percentage of Aggie's revenue comes 
from his package sales, which includes the cover charge, 
beer ai id mi xers. Less than one- f ou r 1" h of Aijyit..'' s total 
revenue comes from food sales. Clearly Aggie's does not 
meet the sixty percent requirement of the ordinances. in 
-• < ; ! ^ at a variety of hot 
food Of served.. ^j^.*-8 - *\v testimony was that on Wednesdays 
~ixd Iiiuj-sday.- . • une item w • . ] able. 
The business license definition --f restaurant is 
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broad. Section 20-14-1 (1971) of the Salt Lake City 
Ordinances states: 
"Restaurant" as used in this chapter 
shall be defined to be any place 
where food or drink is prepared, 
served or offered for sale or sold 










The obvious intent of the city is to regulate all businesses, 
and, therefore, the definition of restaurant must necessarily 
be broad enough to cover all establishments where any food 
at all is served. It is therefore more appropriate to I 
refer to other ordinances, such as zoning and liquor con-
trol, as well as cases, to determine the ordinary definition 
of a restaurant* 
In Leograndis v. Liquor Control Commission, 
149 Conn. 507, 182 A.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1962), the | 
liquor control commission had suspended a restaurant 
liquor permit, and the lower court had dismissed an appeal j 
from the suspension. The plaintiff had liquor sales for i 
undisclosed periods of $47,989.45 as against food sales 
of $2,074.65. The plaintiff admitted he did little or j 
no noon hour business and very little, if any, supper 
•I 
business. Most of his business was done on Friday and | 
Saturday nights, when he provided a band and floor show. -, 
The defendant relied on Section 30-1(17) of the general 
statutes, which defined restaurant as follows: 
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(17) "Restaurant" means space, in a 
suitable and permanent building, kept, 
used, maintained, advertised and held 
out to the public to be a p] ace where hot 
meal s are regularly served, . 
The cour-v Jr construing this statute stated: 
The mere possession of a supply of food 
sufficient to offer a limited number and 
variety of meals would not make the 
premises a restaurant under Section 30-111') 
if there were so few food patrons or 
their demands for food were so insign-
ificant that the service of hot meals 
was not a regular part of the permitee's 
business. 182 A. 2d a t 11 
The court concluded that the commission had 
commi11ed no error i n arri vi rig at its deci s:i oi i 
Fulford v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of 
Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580 (1451) arose from,, - p---
ceedinq before Hi*1 Ho.i r rj of Zon i. n<j Ai 1 jus tun-Mil f oi pot nu as i OJI 
to sell beer in a restaurant, The Board denied permission, 
and the? petitioners appealed to the circuit court, which 
at: f i tinnl tJic BOtji ill's ael; i un , The Supreme Court of Alabama 
held that the sale of bi'oi .in the restaurant would have 
been an unauthorized extension of the nonconform j THI iusir.osii 
under 1" I if * zoning ordinances, Tn its analysis, the court 
cited with approval the following language: 
"A restaurant is defined by Webster to 
be an eating house and such it has always 
been construed under the law and not 
where intoxicants are dispensed under the 
guise of running a restaurant, a restaurant 
keeper in contemplation of law is not: a 
'• ' ' saloon keeper" . "A, restaurant does 
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not necessarily mean a beer and wine 
restaurant, and a written lease of 
premises for use as a restaurant did 
not obligate landlord to assent to 
application for a beer and wine license," 
(citations omitted). 
Appellant's evidence as to the operation of 
Aggie's Club was clear and unrebutted. Aggie's is not 
operated as a public restaurant/ &s such term has been 
defined by Salt Lake City and has been construed by 
the Courts. The bulk of Aggie's revenue comes from 
his package sales. Food constitutes a small part Of 
his total business. 
In addition/ if there was any doubt as to 
what the term "public restaurant" means, the court 
should have considered the construction placed upon 
the term by the parties themselves. When Appellants 
operated the restaurant/ they provided a variety of 
entrees and the salad bar to members. Nikols entered 
in to provide excellent food and service to Athletic 
Club members/ and he continued this operation v.Then he 
opened to the public. That is the best evidence of 
what the parties contemplated when they used the term 
"public restaurant". Aggie's operation differs sub-
stantially from prior operation by Appellants and Nikols. 
Under the Sublease/ Nikols was permitted to 
offer additional service/ but he was not permitted to 
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either change the operation or: eurfaul it, The evidence 
was clear .is hi AiHTie's operation, HMSpnndHnt.s pi<i-
sented no coiiLradictoi y evidence except their nwn self-
serving statements, winch wexe contradicted by Aggie's own 
bus i ii' \ss j eeot ds. • '•• • •' '•• 
• •• Aggie's operation clearly fails to meet the 
stand.* is ui a restaurant I'or I M|UMI HIIII 'UDJIHI | MI I posc.j , 
and : ices not meet: the criteria established by other 
court- which have construed similar Liquor rind zoninq 
• .• " u I d l i a \ ' i ' I <Mlinl I ' a JIM t Li i i i i 
xaw Li*. ;; Respondents were not operat m g the premises as 
a public restaurant. 
POINT 1.1.1 
TttJtii CUUK1' tlRRED IN AWARDING $613.01 
TO RESPONDENTS FOR CHARGES MADE BY 
MEMBERS OF THE SALT LAKE ATHLETIC CLUB. 
• The evidence was clear that there was no agree-
ment for Appellant ' r • *\;; • - . ^ jes mac : . s 
c > i> „ , lestaurant. 
Aggie testified that Appellants nev.-r asked -.* * «*j* 
any charges :-r_ m m . Aggie laLer tt -4 t •* ». . •» : ; 
r :. • K IID th . aarges K y a+hl^tu; • .-,- members 
s • t .-' Aggie would extend them credit, V,ou sen1 a 
statemen- : : . ; ^l.rjers, 
Appellanl -  bookkeeper acknowledged receipt of Aggie's bill 
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and went over it with him, but there is no evidence that | 
she agreed the bill was owed or that she had authority 
to so agree. (See Statement of Facts 28 through 31). I 
There was no evidence that Appellants and DAB 
ever reached any understanding or agreement concerning I 
payment or guaranty of the charges. On the contrary, I 
Aggie testified Appellants refused to guaranty charges 
by members. Moreover, under no principle of contract I 
law could appellants be bound by an agreement or arrange-
ment between Aggie and persons who are also members of I 
the Salt Lake Athletic Club. The trial court erred in I 
awarding the amount of such charges to DAB. 
C O N C L U S I O N - I 
Appellants respectfully request this court to I 
reverse the trial court's decision with regard to | 
Appellants' complaint and to award judgment to Appellants, 
terminating Respondents' possession of the premises, to 
reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to 
Respondent Nikols and Respondents DAB, and to reverse the 
trial court's award of $613.01 to Respondents DAB under 
Count IV of their counterclaim. Appellants also request 
that this court assess damages against all Respondents for 
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their unlawful detainer of the premises from and after 
September 12, 1974, at the rate of $3,000 per month. 
(R. 2 94). 
DATED 4<f 
Respect i.u.l J y subini t;U jd, 
JAMES A. ARROWSMITH 
WATKINS & FABER 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
.. Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
- - • • • ' ' ) . 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief to Hardin A. Whitney and 
Wayne G. Petty, Moyle & Draper, 600 Deseret Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Nikols, and two copies to F. Alan Fletcher, 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 79 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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